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Some people work most effectively behind the scenes. Mr. Justice
R. G. B. Dickson is such a man. A denizen of board rooms before his
appointment to the Manitoba bench in 1963, and a relatively low-profile
judge since then, he was an almost complete stranger to the general public,
and even to many of the legal profession, when he was elevated to the
Supreme Court of Canada last spring.
Dickson's anonymity is accentuated by the fact that the judge he replaced
on the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Emmett Hall, was one who attracted much
publicity.' Yet, although the styles of the two men stand in sharp contrast,
it is the thesis of this article that when the work of Mr. Justice Dickson
receives the attention it deserves, he will be widely acknowledged to be a most
worthy successor to Mr. Justice Hall on Canada's court of last resort.
Of the little that has been written about Mr. Justice Dickson since his
appointment to the Supreme Court, some has been seriously misleading. A
recent article about the court in the Toronto Star,2 for example, branded
Dickson as a "conservative" judge when in fact one of the most remarkable
aspects of his judicial work has been his liberalism. Such misconceptions are
probably attributable to a number of paradoxes that mark the Dickson career.
A man of compelling ambition, with both the thirst and talent for leadership,
he has usually contrived to avoid the public limelight. A corporation coun-
sellor, with negligible courtroom experience, he quickly came to be regarded
as one of Manitoba's most effective trial judges. A man of wealth, a senior
partner of one of Winnipeg's oldest and largest law firms, and an active
member of some of the most conservative segments of the Canadian com-
mercial and social establishment, he has exhibited on the bench an empathy
for the little man, an impatience with technicalities that impede justice, a
tolerance for deviant ideas, and a generally left-of-centre orientation. The
biographical data that follows may shed some light on these apparent in-
consistencies, although several questions remain unanswered.
Dickson was born in Yorkton, Saskatchewan, in 1916. Christened
Robert George Brian, he has always been known as Brian by his family and
friends. His father was a peripatetic bank manager, whose frequent transfers
took the family to several prairie towns while Brian and his brother were
small. However, Regina was their home during most of Brian's school years.
* Professor of Law, University of Manitoba. A significant contribution to the
research for the article was made by Lee Gibson.
' F. Vaughan, "Emmett Matthew Hall: The Activist as Justice" (1972), 10 Osgoode
Hall L. J. 411.
2 Rae Corelli, 'Iere's a New Order Coming to Our Highest Court", Toronto Star,
Jan. 12, 1974, p. B1.
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His mother, who had been one of the earliest female graduates of Trinity
College, Dublin, was very ambitious for her sons. Brian was a studious boy,
and under his mother's stimulus he was very successful at school. He claims
to have been only about twelve years old when, fascinated by mock trials
that were staged by his Boy Scout troop, he decided to become a lawyer. He
never wavered in his career objective thereafter, although it was to be a long
time before he acquired extensive courtroom experience.
About the time that Brian graduated from high school, his father was
transferred to Winnipeg, where Brian enrolled at the University of Manitoba.
The minimum entrance requirement for the Manitoba Law School was the
completion of two years of the Bachelor of Arts program, and as soon as he
had finished Second Year Arts, he registered at the Law School, and entered
articles of clerkship with the Winnipeg law firm of Scarth, Guild and Honey-
man.
It was 1934 - the depth of the great depression that wrought world-
wide economic devastation, and dealt especially cruelly with the Canadian
prairies. Life was not easy for a law student. Although the price of most
commodities was low, tuition fees at the Manitoba Law School had actually
been increased to offset reduced enrollments. To earn enough to meet both
tuition costs and living expenses was extremely difficult. Salaries paid to
articled students were either nominal or non-existent, and part-time employ-
ment was very hard to find. The depression left indelible marks on the
personalities of many Canadians. In some it bred a permanent sense of
defeat; in others it led to an attitude of excessive caution. To a few who, like
Brian Dickson, were able to meet its challenges successfully, the depression
provided great motivational momentum. When asked by the writer to identify
the source of his restless ambition, Mr. Justice Dickson pointed without
hesitation to the depression. It might be useful in this connection to mention
that one of Dickson's fellow law students at the time, who felt the economic
stress of the depression even more intensely than he, was Ian Sinclair, whose
relentless ambition took him to the Presidency of the Canadian Pacific Rail-
way Company, and the summit of the Canadian business world.
When he graduated from the Manitoba Law School in 1938, Brian
Dickson was awarded the University and Law Society Gold Medals for the
highest standing in his class. Even that fact was not enough to ensure him
employment in the profession of his choice, however; when he completed
his service under articles the following year, he was forced by the scarcity
of legal openings to take a position in the investment department of the
Great-West Life Assurance Company. Not long after, an even wider wedge
was driven between Dickson and the practise of law by World War H.
Joining the Royal Canadian Artillery, Dickson was sent overseas in
1940. The same industry and competence that he had displayed as a law
student won him rapid promotion, and in 1943 he was returned to a staff
post in Canada with the rank of Major. This enabled him to marry his
fiancee, Barbara Sellers, but he was not content to serve in Canada when all
the action was in Europe. Eventually, by agreeing to return to the rank of
Captain, Dickson was successful in obtaining another overseas posting. He
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served with distinction during the early part of the Normandy invasion, and
was mentioned in dispatches. Then, during the battle of Falaise Gap, he was
severely wounded, resulting in the loss of a leg.
When he returned to civilian life in 1945, Brian Dickson was asked to
join Aikins, Loftus & Co., one of Winnipeg's most prominent law firms.
Professional success came swiftly. A powerful intellect, a talent for organ-
ization, compulsive work habits, and a gift of good judgment quickly made
him much sought after as legal advisor to the business community. His
company directorships eventually included the Imperial Bank of Canada,
Federal Grain Limited, Bristol Aircraft, and TransAir Limited. He was very
active in professional organizations, serving as President and Life Bencher of
the Law Society of Manitoba, Honorary Treasurer of the Canadian Bar
Association, and a member of the Manitoba Bar Association Council. He was
appointed Queen's Counsel in 1953.
On the personal side, a happy marriage produced four children and an
active social life. Refusing to be hampered by the loss of his leg, Dickson
followed a number of outdoor pursuits (swimming, duck hunting, horseback
riding) and operated a hobby cattle ranch. He and his family travelled widely.
No doubt through the influence of his partner, John A. MacAulay, Q.C.,
Dickson and his wife began an art collection, which now contains important
paintings by artists of the French Impressionist and Canadian Group of
Seven schools.
The work that Dickson has done over the years for cultural, philan-
thropic and social service organizations has been too extensive to record
fully. He has served on the boards of the Winnipeg General Hospital, the
Winnipeg Foundation, the Sellers Foundation, the North American Wildlife
Foundation, the Dafoe Foundation and the Winnipeg Art Gallery. He has
acted as Chancellor of the Anglican Archdiocese of Rupertsland (legal
advisor for the prairie region of the Anglican Church of Canada), and as
Chairman of the University of Manitoba's Board of Governors. In all these
posts his influence on the affairs of the organization in question has been
great, though usually exercised by quiet persuasion rather than by public
controversy.
Three of Dickson's contributions to public service - his Presidency of
the Manitoba Red Cross Society in 1950, his Chairmanship of the Manitoba
Civil Service Commission for several years, and his membership on the Board
of Trustees of the Manitoba Law School during the final years of its existence
- deserve special attention because of what they reveal about his values and
his style.
In 1950, at the request of his partner, John A. MacAulay, Q.C., who was
national Chairman of the Canadian Red Cross Society, Dickson agreed to
act as Manitoba Chairman of the organization. He had been assured that
the assignment involved little more than attendance at a few meetings during
the course of the year. In early May, while he was in Ottawa for a meeting
of the National Council of the Red Cross, he received word from Winnipeg
that the flooding caused by abnormally high spring run-off levels on the Red
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and Assiniboine Rivers had reached very serious proportions, and that the
Red Cross would be called upon to play a large role in assisting flood victims.
Dickson flew home immediately, arriving in time to represent the Red Cross
at an emergency conference held in the Premier's office at 2:00 A.M., May 7,
to create a co-ordinated organization for dealing with what by then was rec-
ognized as a major disaster. It was agreed at that meeting that while the
armed forces would undertake primary responsibility for dike building and
other direct forms of flood fighting, the Red Cross would be responsible for
all relief work, as well as for providing food, coffee, etc. to the tens of thou-
sands of military and volunteer flood fighters toiling on sandbag dikes. To
accomplish this mammoth task, the Manitoba Red Cross Society had only one
full-time employee and a handful of voluntary workers. Brian Dickson under-
took that night to assume leadership of the Red Cross operations on a full-
time basis for the duration of the emergency, and he did not return to his law
office for the next six weeks. Drawing heavily upon his military experience, he
created an organization of some 4,000 volunteers which carried out large
scale relief and service functions with remarkable speed and efficiency.
Although many thousands of Manitobans were assisted in one way or another
by this Red Cross operation, very few of them even knew of the existence
of the man whose vitality and organizational genius made it work.
In 1953 Dickson accepted an appointment as Chairman of the Manitoba
Civil Service Commission. The Commission had been created a few years
previously in an attempt to remove from the political arena the hiring and
firing of civil servants and the determination of their conditions of employ-
ment. The Commission was to be chaired by a person independent of the
government, and was charged with supervising government hiring and pro-
motion practises, making recommendations with respect to senior civil service
appointments, pay scales, and other employment terms within the civil service,
and hearing appeals from dismissals of government employees. Although he
devoted one afternoon every week or ten days to meetings of the Commission
over the next five years, Dickson refused to accept the salary that went with
the Chairmanship, for fear that it might somehow be thought to compromise
the independence of the position. He had little cause for concern on that
account, however; the Civil Service Commission during Dickson's Chairman-
ship carried out its responsibilities effectively, and with judicial detachment.
About the time his term of office with the Civil Service Commission
expired, Dickson was named to the Board of Trustees of the Manitoba Law
School. At that time, the school, which was operated jointly by the University
and the Law Society, offered part-time instruction only. Although they at-
tended classes every weekday morning during the school term, law students
were required to work in law offices as articled clerks for the balance of the
day, as well as during the summer months. While the school had a small
full-time faculty, most instruction was provided by busy members of the
practising bar.
In most other parts of Canada this pattern of legal education had been
supplanted by full-time university study, followed by a period of practical
experience in law offices, but Manitoba lawyers preferred to retain the system
under which they themselves had been trained. However, Brian Dickson had
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his doubts. He knew that the quality of instruction offered by law firms to
their articled students varied greatly from office to office, and that the pres-
sure of articling duties left students little time to digest the masses of informa-
tion hurriedly fed to them during the morning lectures. As one of the
lecturers in the school's part-time LL.M. program, he knew the difficulties
that the exigencies of a thriving practice place in the path of a part-time
teacher. He had felt the embarrassment of having to admit to friends who
enquired about a legal education for themselves or their children that Mani-
toba did not have as much to offer as many other provinces.
Shortly after joining the school's Board of Trustees, Dickson quietly
sounded out some of the students for suggested improvements, and urged
the Board to take remedial action. The first step, approved by the Board
only a few months after Dickson's appointment, was an increase in the full-
time faculty. From then until his resignation from the Board of Trustees in
1964, Dickson was the most influential force on the Board. As the con-
troversy over the merits of concurrent articling heightened, he took no public
part in the debate, but his quiet insistence on higher quality led to a series
of improvements culminating in the eventual abolition of concurrent articling.
He pressed for the appointment of more full-time professors and resisted
the proposal that such additional staff should be enlisted from the ranks of
retired judges. He prompted the Trustees to provide better salaries and staff
benefits, and he persuaded them to take a generally more liberal approach
as well to other expenditures designed to improve the school's program.
It was during Dickson's term as President of the Law Society of
Manitoba that the Society set up a committee to advise on the future of legal
education in Manitoba. While his personal role in that development is difficult
to document, it is unlikely that its occurrence during Dickson's term of office
was merely co-incidental. When the Committee produced a very cautious
recommendation, calling for the retention of concurrent articling during most
of the program, but for full-time study in the first year, Dickson urged the
Board to implement the proposed change rapidly. At the same time, however,
he contacted the Law Society of Upper Canada, which was refusing to accept
Manitoba graduates into its Bar Admission course, to learn whether this
change, together with the other improvements that had been made, would
satisfy the Ontario admission requirements. On learning that Ontario would
withhold recognition until Manitoba established an entirely full-time LL.B.
program, Dickson induced the Board of Trustees, without even waiting to see
the results of the full-time first year experiment, to adopt and obtain Law
Society and University approval for a three year full-time LL.B. program, to
be followed by articling and Bar Admission training. Since the cost involved
was thought to be too great for the Law Society to bear, it was agreed to
terminate the 50-year-old co-operative agreement between the University
and the Law Society, and the Faculty of Law of the University of Manitoba
came into existence; another unmarked monument to the career of a remark-
able behind-the-scenes lawyer.
One of the few types of community activity in which Dickson seems
never to have participated to any significant degree is politics. Although he
is generally supposed to have been a Liberal, while his wife's family
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have been supporters of the Conservative Party, financially and otherwise,
there is very little evidence of any interest in political partisanship on Dick-
son's part. In fact, there are stories of resentment among more actively partisan
Liberal lawyers that Dickson's 1963 appointment to the Manitoba Court of
Queen's Bench was not bestowed on someone to whom the party was more
deeply in political debt.
After his appointment to the bench, Mr. Justice Dickson continued to
make extensive extracurricular contributions to the community. Indeed, he
undertook several new positions on the boards of social and cultural organi-
zations (partly, he says, to escape the isolation of the judicial cloisters from
time to time). He served, for example, with great distinction as Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the University of Manitoba during a rather
vexed period of that institution's history. However, the most important aspect
by far of Dickson's career during the past decade has been his work on the
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench and Court of Appeal.
One of the many myths to which the legal profession clings, no matter
how often it has been proved wrong, is that in order to be an effective trial
judge it is necessary to have had extensive experience as trial counsel. When
Dickson was first appointed to the bench, many Manitoba lawyers expressed
the opinion that it was a mistake to have selected a person with so little pre-
vious courtroom exposure. While his inexperience in this regard is sometimes
exaggerated - he had shown himself to be a skilled advocate in many
appearances before various regulatory boards and commissions - it is
true that he was not very familiar with the work of trial courts, especially
in criminal matters. However, this inexperience hampered him very little.
Within a short time the comments heard among the practising profession
about his performance as a trial judge were almost universally favourable.
He acquired the requisite knowledge of procedural and evidentiary rules
very quickly, and from the beginning he displayed a firm and even-handed
courtroom demeanour. Even criminal trials were taken in stride; in fact,
Dickson developed a special love for the drama of the jury trial, and acquired
a reputation for the fairness and lucidity of his jury charges.
Looking back on Mr. Justice Dickson's published judgments as a trial
judge yields several impressions. First, one is struck by their sheer number.
The primary reason for this is that Dickson brought with him to the bench
an enormous appetite for work. It may also be explained in part by the fact
that Dickson seems to have striven harder than most trial judges to express
his reasons for judgment in a form that law report editors would regard as
publishable. In fact, his first few reported decisions seem, in retrospect, to
have involved such straightforward problems that they did not really merit
written reasons for judgment at all.3
This leads one to a second impression: that Dickson was concerned
a See, for example, Northern Messenger v. Fabbro (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 73
(Man. Q.B.); Shriner v. Mularski (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 558 (Man. Q.B.); LeClerc
v. LeClerc (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 770 (Man. Q.B.).
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from the beginning to influence posterity. That he should apparently have
courted the attention of the law reports and through them of the legal profes-
sion may seem inconsistent with Dickson's previous aversion to publicity, but
it is entirely compatible with his lifelong desire to play a role of influence in
the outcome of events.
A third impression is of a judge impatient with technicalities, and de-
termined to reach just solutions to the problems brought before him, even
if this required some judicial creativity in interpreting the applicable law.
In the early years this desire to arrive at a solution that common sense would
approve occasionally produced decisions that were questionable in law. In
Re Shields and City of Winnipeg,4 for example, Dickson held that the
Mechanics Lien Act does not apply to work done by private contractors on
public streets. While this conclusion was unexceptional in light of the wording
of the statute and the fact of Crown ownership of all streets, the reasoning
employed to reach the conclusion - that "public policy" would not permit
any other result - was dubious at best. In Machray v. Zionist Labour
Organization5 an incorporated association which had no power to hold land
entered a contract to purchase certain land, paying a deposit of $5,000.
Later, the organization refused to complete the transaction, and when sued
for the difference between the purchase price and the amount the property
was eventually sold for, it raised the defence of ultra vires, and counter-
claimed for return of the deposit. Mr. Justice Dickson dismissed both the
claim and the counterclaim. While that outcome may have been a reasonably
equitable solution to the problem, it was based on the questionable holding
that ultra vires may not be raised as a defence unless the parties can still be
returned to their original positions. Even if that principle is correct, it is
difficult to understand why, after holding that the parties could not be
restored to their previous positions, he dismissed the plaintiff's action.
It must be stressed that cases like these were rare aberrations. Dickson
normally displayed great skill, especially after his first few years on the bench,
in achieving equitable results by means of orthodox legal techniques. The
significance of cases like Shields and Machray is that they demonstrate, at a
stage when Dickson was not quite so adept at disguising it, his result-oriented
approach to judging.
With his appointment to the Manitoba Court of Appeal in 1967, Mr.
Justice Dickson's productivity became even more impressive. He participated
in more decisions and wrote more reasons for judgment, by a very wide
margin, than any other member of the court while he served on it. Even
compared to the record of so prolific a judge as Chief Justice Samuel Freed-
man, Dickson's output was extraordinary. The secret of his ability to produce
so much material so rapidly lay in two factors: (a) a very quick mind, and
(b) a highly efficient method of operation, involving the dictation of ten-
tative judgments as soon as he left the bench, while the material was still
fresh in his mind, to be put into final form later.
4 (1965), 47 D.L.R. (2d) 346 (Man. Q.B.).
5 (1966), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 657 (Man. Q.B.).
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Dickson's role on the Court of Appeal was by no means confined to
writing reasons for judgment. His influence on his fellow judges in the dis-
cussion of cases coming before the court seems to have been very great.
Here, as in much of his previous work, he proved to be a master of behind-
the-scenes deliberations. In view of the large number of cases in which
Dickson participated, the number of dissenting opinions he wrote is remark-
ably small. One reason for this was undoubtedly a reluctance to waste his
energy on lost causes, but another was probably the fact that by seizing the
initiative with a rapidly prepared draft judgment, and defending it convinc-
ingly in judicial conferences, he was frequently able to persuade his brethren
to see things his way.
In addition to all this, Dickson made a greater than normal contribution
to the day-to-day administration of court business. In short, no other judge
has played so influential a role in judicial matters within Manitoba in recent
years.
In a recent conversation with the writer, Mr. Justice Dickson expressed
concern to avoid becoming a "predictable" judge, and to this point in his
judicial career he has been most successful in doing so. His approach has
been pragmatic and remarkably free from apparent bias. Nevertheless, it is
inevitable that a decade of decision-making by a prolific, articulate and self-
consistent judge will exhibit certain patterns or trends that may have
predictive value.
An examination of Dickson's published reasons for judgment to date
leads the writer to the conclusion that the best general description of his
judicial approach would be "moderately liberal". If the judges who sat with
Dickson on the Manitoba Court of Appeal were ranked on a philosophical
continuum from left to right, most observers would, on most questions,
assign the furthest left position to Chief Justice Freedman. Most would prob-
ably also place Mr. Justice Dickson immediately to Freedman's right: some-
what, though not very far, left of centre. However, such generalizations can
be deceptive. On some issues, Dickson's liberalism has been much more
marked than on others. It may be more useful to examine his work in the
narrower context of a few illustrative categories.
In tort cases, Dickson has tended to be quite generous to injured
plaintiffs, both on questions of liability and on questions of damages. Of the
many illustrations that could be cited,6 perhaps the most striking are two
negligence cases in which Dickson gave much greater elasticity to the concept
of "reasonable foresight" than many courts would have thought justifiable.
In McKenzie v. Hyde,7 the defendants, while breaking up concrete in a
driveway, carelessly pulled up a buried natural-gas pipe line, causing it to
pull away from the gas main which ran under a nearby lane. Gas escaping
from the rupture seeped up through the porous soil of the lane, and was
6 Eg.: Peters v. North Star Oil Ltd. (1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 364 (Man. Q.B.);
Rudy v. Peterson (1966), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 447 (Man. Q.B.); Saari v. Sunshine Riding
Academy (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 92 (Man. CA.).
7 (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 362 (Man. Q.B.).
[VOL. 12, NO. 2
Unobtrusive Justice
blown by the wind into the open basement window of a house on the other
side of the lane. When the accumulation of gas in the basement reached the
necessary density, it was ignited by a furnace pilot light, and the house was
demolished. Mr. Justice Dickson rejected the defendant's argument that the
accident was too remote a consequence of the negligence to be actionable,
holding that even though expert witnesses had called it "freakish", and "one
in a million!' the explosion was well within the range of reasonable foresight.
An even more unusual chain of events was involved in the case of School
Division of Assiniboine South No. 3 v. Hoffer.8 A fourteen-year-old boy was
permitted by his father to operate the father's snowmobile near the family
home in a residential suburb of Winnipeg. Because he required both hands to
pull the starting cord, the boy had been instructed by his father to tie the
throttle open, and then to raise the track off the ground by means of a
kick-stand, before attempting to start the machine. On the day in question, the
boy tied the throttle open, but forgot to use the kick-stand, with the result
that as soon as it started, the snowmobile ran away, riderless, at a speed of
about 30 miles per hour. It ran over a snowbank, across a parking lot, and
into a schoolyard where it eventually collided with a natural gas riser pipe
beside the school, some 100 yards away from where it began. Gas escaping
from the fractured pipe entered the school by means of a ventilation duct
near where the collision occurred, and after some time the accumulated gas
in the school was ignited by a pilot light. Extensive damage was sustained by
the school in the ensuing explosion. Dickson held the father and his son liable
for this damage, on the ground that it was the type of damage they ought
reasonably to have foreseen as a consequence of their negligent operation of
the snowmobile.
Although Dickson has generally displayed considerable impatience with
"technical" arguments, he demonstrated a willingness in Dahlberg v. Naydiuk9
to employ such an argument for the benefit of a farmer injured by a deer-
hunter's rifle. The plaintiff had framed his action alternatively in negligence
and trespass, and Dickson seized upon that fact to place the defendant under
the onus of disproving negligence. Acknowledging that the rule is "one of
those strange anomalies of the law", which has been rejected by modem
courts in both England and New Zealand,' he relied on an obiter dictum
from a Supreme Court of Canada decision" to justify placing the onus of
proof on the defendant in cases which, although based on allegedly negligent
conduct, are described in the pleadings as trespass cases.
In cases where injured plaintiffs have sought access to some insurance
fund, private or public, to compensate their losses, Dickson has treated the
claims sympathetically.' 2
8 (1972), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 608 (Man. CA.).
9 (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 319 (Man. C.A.).
10 Fowler v. Lanning, [1959] 1 Q.B. 426 (Q.B.); Letang v. Cooper, [1964] 2 All
E.R. 929 (C.A.); Beals v. Hayward, [1960] N.Z.L.R. 131 (S.Ct.).
"Cook v. Lewis, [1952] 1 D.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
12 Eg.: Filuk v. Fireman's Insurance Co. (1965), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 367 (Man. Q.B.).
Jackimowich v. Halifax (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 542 (Man. Q.B.).
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It would be wrong to leave the impression that Mr. Justice Dickson has
never been found on the defendant's side in a tort claim. He concurred in the
Court of Appeal's controversial application of the ex turpi causa defence to
a personal injury claim in Rondos v. Wawrin,'3 for example, and he has
consistently rejected arguments which would increase the time within which
actions may be commenced.' 4 On the whole, however, counsel appearing
before Dickson in tort cases have been happier to be acting for the plaintiff
than for the defendant.
On criminal matters, Dickson's stance has been decidedly less liberal.
Comparing his performance with that of his colleagues on the Manitoba
Court of Appeal, this may not seem obvious. One of his rare dissenting judg-
ments, for example, took issue with the majority's decision that two young
men convicted of a vicious beating should serve very lengthy prison sentences
in spite of the fact that they had led productive, law-abiding lives in the five
years that had elapsed since the offence. 5 In fact, whenever the court divided,
whether with respect to conviction or to sentence, Dickson usually voted with
the side more favourable to the accused.16 The reason such comparisons are
deceptive is that the Manitoba Court of Appeal has, as a body, been very
conservative on criminal matters.17 While Dickson's attitudes may seem liberal
in relation to those of his colleagues, they are, in comparison to the views
of the average Canadian judge, probably somewhat right of centre. He has
approved the use of preventive detention for a persistent sexual offender,18
upheld convictions based on children's evidence in sexual cases,' 9 permitted
involuntary statements by the accused to be admitted in contradiction of the
accused's courtroom testimony on the ground that it is exculpatory,20 con-
curred in an increase from one to six months of the sentence of a young
student convicted of selling marijuana,2' rejected most "technical" defences
raised by accused persons, including several aimed at contesting the accuracy
13 (1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d) 658 (Man. C.A.). See D. Gibson, Torts - Illegality
of Plaintiff's Conduct as a Defence (1969), 47 Can. Bar Rev. 89.
14 Eg.: Homenick v. Wiebe (1965), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 187 (Man. Q.B.) (reversed
on other grounds (1965), 50 D.L.1L (2d) 287 (Man. C.A.)); Medgyes v. Nyznik
(1967), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 391 (Man. Q.B.).
15 R. v. Miller and Couvreur (1972), 8 C.C.C. (2d) 97 (Man. C.A.).
1OEg.: R. v. Prince, [1970] 2 C.C.C. 213 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Nadeau (1971), 1
C.C.C. (2d) 83 (Man. C.A.). On occasion Dickson's view was even more favourable to
the defence than that of Mr. Justice Freedman: Eg.: R. v. Vogelle and Reid, [1970] 3
C.C.C. 171 (Man. C.A.).
'7The court acquired such a reputation for the harshness of its sentences that on
one occasion it found it necessary to refute a magistrate's contention that the Court of
Appeal "does not, in most instances, consider rehabilitation" in meting out criminal
sentences: R. v. Anderson (1971), 1 C.C.. (2d) 228 (Man. C.A.).
'8R. v. McAmmond (1970), 7 D.L.R. (3d) 346 (Man. C.A.). He did refuse
to impose such a sentence where fraud and breaking and entering were involved, how-
ever: R. v. Nadeau (1971), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 83 (Man. C.A.).
'
9 R. v. Bannerman (1966), 55 W.W.R. 257 (Man. CA.); R. v. Taylor (1971)
1 C.C.C. (2d) 321 (Man. C.A.).
20 R. v. Piche, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 257 (Man. C.A.).
21 R. v. McNicol, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 56 (Man. C.A.).
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of breathalyzer procedures,2 and upheld obscenity convictions with respect
to several pornographic publications of the "hard core" variety.23
There have been some notable exceptions to this pattern, however. On
two or three matters in the criminal law field, Mr. Justice Dickson has been
the author of quite significant liberalizing decisions. One such was R. v.
Hefer,2 in which a vagrancy conviction of an unemployed, but inoffensive
young "hippy" was set aside. Accepting an invitation by counsel to treat the
appeal as a test case, Mr. Justice Dickson examined the law of vagrancy at
length, and in historical context, concluding that it should not be applied to
mere wanderers or rovers, but only to those to whom some dishonest or
disreputable conduct can be attributed. "It cannot", he said, "be the intent
of [the vagrancy provisions of the Criminal Code] to stigmatize as criminal
every young person who travels across the country without employment and
with little money in his pocket."25
In R. v. P.26 Dickson wrote the principal opinion in a case that placed
an important restriction on the meaning of "gross indecency". At one time
the Criminal Code had proscribed only acts of gross indecency occurring
between male persons, but the Code had been amended in 1949 to include
females. Although the change seems to have been due largely to Parliament's
belated discovery of lesbianism, the language used would also cover acts of
gross indecency between men and women, and concern had been expressed
that the section might be interpreted as prohibiting unorthodox sexual prac-
tises by married couples or lovers. In 1965 the Manitoba Court of Appeal
had adopted just such an interpretation, holding that an act of fellatio by a
man and woman in private constituted gross indecency.27 Although the
woman in that case probably did not consent to the act, the court stated that
it would have been gross indecency even if she had consented. In R. v. P.
the same court dealt again with the same question, the only salient differences
being that this time consent was clearly established, the parties claimed to be
living together in a common-law relationship, and the composition of the
court had changed. Mr. Justice Dickson and the majority of the court dis-
missed the charge this time. Dickson distinguished the earlier case on the
question of consent, and held that while certain heterosexual acts could, de-
pending on time, place and circumstance, be regarded as gross indecency,
"[iut would require words much plainer than appear in s. 149 to persuade me
that Parliament suddenly decided to enter the portals of the home and to
require Courts to sit in judgment upon what passes in private between con-
senting adult spouses - or, for that matter, upon any heterosexual act (save,
22 Eg.: R. v. Evanson (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 275 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Willms
(1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 358 (Man. C.A.).
25R. v. Great West News Ltd., [19701 4 C.C.C. 307 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Prairie
.8chooner News (1971), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 251 (C.A.).
24R. v. Heifer (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 229 (Man. CA.).
25Id. at 234.
26, [1968] 3 C.C.C. 129 (Man. C.A.).
2 7 R. v. Le Francois, [1965] 4 C.C.C. 255 (Man. C.A.).
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of course, that described in s. 147) done in private between consenting
adults."28
A decision that should be included among Dickson's "liberal" pro-
nouncements in the criminal field even though it was hard on the particular
accused is R. v. Fuller.2 9 That case concerned a sentencing practise that had
over the years become known as the "Winnipeg floater". In the case of
minor criminal convictions, magistrates would sometimes, after imposing
sentence, announce that the warrant of committal would be withheld for a
specified period - usually a few days - to give the accused an opportunity
to leave the province rather than serving the sentence. The purpose of the
practise was, in the words of two highly respected Manitoba judges, to provide
the community with "an inexpensive means of ridding it of undesirables",30
thus attaining "all the benefits that would enure from imprisonment without
the burden of expense."' In the Fuller case a young man had been convicted
of possession of marijuana, and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. The
magistrate had said to the accused, "I assume Mr. Fuller, that you are plan-
ning to leave the city", and had directed that the warrant of committal be
withheld for seven days. When the Crown appealed this sentence, Mr. Justice
Dickson held, for the Court of Appeal, that the practise of withholding war-
rants is illegal, and ordered that the accused serve the sentence imposed,
subject to the right to seek leave to appeal its severity. Taking issue with what
previous judges had said about the usefulness of the "floater", Dickson com-
mented:
In Canada communities are interdependent and relations between them should
be marked by mutual respect and understanding. A practice whereby one com-
munity seeks to rid itself of undesirables by foisting them off on other com-
munities violates this basic concept of consideration for the rights of others and
should not be tolerated.8 2
Wherever one may believe that Dickson should be placed in.the criminal
law spectrum, there can be little doubt that in most other fields of law his
views lie, as in the case of torts, somewhat to the left of centre. In labor law
disputes, for example, he has agreed with the union position more frequently
than most of his colleagues.3 3 In child custody matters, he has tended to give
greater emphasis to the welfare of the children than to the rights of the
parents.84
There is one decision which appears at first glance to contradict the
28, [1968] 3 C.C.C. 129 at 146 (Man. C.A.).
29, [19691 3 C.C.C. 348 (Man. C.A.).
30 Per Prendergast, J., in R. v. Fitzpatrick (1915), 25 D.L.R. 727, at 728 (Man.
K.B.).
81 Per Dysart, J., in R. v. Litman (1922), 68 D.L.R. 429, at 443 (Man. K.B.).
2, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 348 at 351 (Man. C.A.).
83Eg.: R. v. Manitoba Labour B'oard (1967), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 540 (Man. Q.B.);
Channel Seven T.V. Ltd. v. N.A.B.E.T. (1972), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 424 (Man. CA.);
McEvoy v. Capri (1964), 48 W.W.R. 474 (Man. Q.B. reversed on appeal).
B4 Eg.: Re Goldstein (1971), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 102 (Man. C.A.); Re Vickell (1971),
17 D.L.R. (3d) 497 (Man. C.A.); Re Ducharme (1973), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 739 (Man.
C.A.).
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latter trend, but which on closer examination probably confirms it. It also
sheds a little light on the nature of Dickson's liberalism. The case is Re Van-
denberg and Guimond,8 5 in which separated "common law" spouses each
claimed custody of the children of the marriage. The man was a white
Protestant, of Dutch ancestry; the mother a Roman Catholic of Canadian
Indian descent. At the time of the separation there were two children, girls
aged seven and three years, and the mother was pregnant once more. Al-
though both were employed, the father's income, while moderate, was more
than double that of the mother. The father lived in a modest home, and the
mother in rented rooms. The father objected to the fact that if the children
remained with the mother they would be raised as Roman Catholics. He
also feared that they would end up living either in a convent or on an
Indian reservation. (One of them already had been left temporarily on a
reservation when the mother could not arrange for a sitter). The trial judge
had held that, giving priority to the welfare of the children, custody should
be awarded to the father. Mr. Justice Dickson reached the opposite con-
clusion, holding that in the case of illegitimate children the mother has a
prima facie right to custody, which can be displaced only by showing that
the mother has done something to demonstrate her unfitness as a parent.
In view of the fact that the relevant legislation gave him considerable
latitude in the matter, one could interpret Dickson's decision as a rejection,
in the case of illegitimate children, of the principle that the welfare of the
child takes precedence over the rights of the parent. Such an interpretation
would be mistaken, however. Although he did not say so in so many words,
Mr. Justice Dickson was holding, in effect, that there was no reason to believe
that these children would be better off with their father than with their
mother. He asserted that the tender age of the children argued for maternal
custody, and dealt with the financial imbalance by ordering the father to make
maintenance payments for the children. And on the question of conflicting
life-styles, he had this to say:
The second ground upon which the Judge rested his decision was expressed by
him in these words:
Indeed it is probable that these children will find themselves in an institu-
tional environment of a temporary or permanent nature or under the in-
fluence of life on a Reservation.
With respect, we do not deem the prospect of convent life for the religious train-
ing of a Roman Catholic child or the influence of life on a Reservation for an
Indian child to be considerations entitling a Court to take from a Roman Catholic
mother of Indian descent the custody of children born to her. We find nothing
in either of these circumstances detrimental to the interests of the children.30
In this last passage the reader comes as close as he may ever come to
an articulation of Dickson's liberalism. It seems to be rooted, not in any
mild patrician radicalism, or soft-hearted empathy, but rather in a reluctance
to foist his values on others. Whether from self-doubt, or from a compelling
sense of fairness, the wealthy white Anglican refuses to find that the life-style
with which he is familiar is superior to that of the poor Indian Catholic. The
85 (1969), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 573 (Man. C.A.).
36 Id. at 582.
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ambitious, highly organized, compulsive worker refuses to castigate the aim-
less unemployed drifter. Perhaps it is this phenomenon that explains the
paradox of a card-carrying establishmentarian who tends to vote against the
interests of his former colleagues and clients. It is not that he has undergone
a personal conversion, but rather that, conscious of his personal preferences,
he leans backwards to avoid being biased by them.
Since the Supreme Court's most important assignment during the next
decade will be the determination of difficult constitutional questions, an
ability to predict Mr. Justice Dickson's performance in the field of constitu-
tional law would be of great value. Unfortunately, his work to date has
involved too few constitutional problems to permit a confident prediction to
be made.
His most important constitutional decision so far might lead some to
the conclusion that on questions of the distribution of legislative powers he
will be found most frequently in the centralist camp. In that case, Reference
Re Interprovincial Trade Restrictions on Agricultural Commodities,37 he held
that a hypothetical Manitoba egg marketing scheme that would have given
provincial authorities the de facto power to regulate the flow of eggs into
Manitoba from other provinces was ultra vires on the ground that it infringed
federal jurisdiction over "trade and commerce" under section 91 (2) of the
B.N.A. Act, as well as contravening section 121 of that Act. It must be borne
in mind, however, that this was a trumped-up case, designed to deal with a
very peculiar situation. Egg producers in Manitoba and other provinces had
experienced difficulty marketing their eggs in Quebec because the Quebec
egg marketing authority discriminated against out-of-province eggs in its
purchasing practices. After several unsuccessful attempts to have the legality
of the Quebec practices considered by the courts, the Manitoba government
hit upon a clever expedient: it announced its intention to create a regulatory
scheme identical to that in force in Quebec, and then referred this proposal
to the courts for a determination of its constitutionality. It is hardly surprising
that a pragmatic judge like Dickson, knowing the real purpose of the reference
and knowing the disastrous impact that Quebec's discriminatory purchasing
policies were having on egg producers in other parts of the country, should
have ruled the scheme ultra vires.
That this decision should not be regarded as evidence of an invariable
preference on Dickson's part for federal jurisdiction was demonstrated by his
subsequent holding, in A.-G. for Manitoba v. Burns Foods Ltd.,5 8 that a quite
similar marketing scheme for hogs in Manitoba was within provincial com-
petence. His attempt to distinguish the egg marketing case on the ground
that the extraprovincial aspects of the scheme were much more significant
in that case was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada.89 In his only other
37 (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 326 (Man. CA.); affirmed (1971), 19 D.L.R. (3d)
169 (S.C.C.).
38 (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 581 (Man. C.A.). Dickson had reached earlier a similar
conclusion with respect to a vegetable marketing scheme in Gershman v. Manitoba
Marketing Board (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 320 (Man. C.A.).
ao Burns Food Ltd. v. A.G. for Manitoba (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 731 (S.C.C.).
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significant decision concerning the distribution of constitutional powers, R. V.
Buzunis,40 Dickson held that a provincial statute imposing punishment on
real estate brokers for "any fraudulent act not punishable under the Criminal
Code", did not trench upon federal jurisdiction over criminal law.
These cases offer ample evidence that Mr. Justice Dickson is not likely
to exhibit any inordinately federal bias on jurisdictional questions. On the
other hand, it would be a mistake to read a predominant "provincial rights"
attitude into them. They are probably best explained by Dickson's prag-
matism, manifesting itself in a reluctance to interfere with any regulation or
operation, federal or provincial, that appears to be socially justifiable, and
functionally effective. On the crucial question of where he would stand in
the case of a federal attempt to pass some useful new legislative scheme which
interfered with pre-existing provincial legislation, Dickson's previous decisions
are of no assistance. One may venture the guess, however, that he would be
more likely than not to favour such federal legislation, if only because
Manitobans, in common with most residents of the less prosperous provinces,
have generally tended to support federal initiatives.
On the subject of civil liberties, Mr. Justice Dickson would appear to be
at least as liberal as he is on most other issues. It is true that he concurred
in a Court of Appeal decision that the Criminal Code requirement to submit
to breath analysis on demand does not constitute a compulsion "to give
evidence" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights.41 Yet, on the other hand,
he made use of the Bill of Rights in Canard v. A.-G. of Canada42 to invalidate
important provisions of the Indian Act, and used the opportunity to deliver
an uncharacteristically eloquent statement concerning equality of opportunity
for native people.
The plaintiff was the widow of a deceased Manitoba Indian. She applied
for and obtained under provincial law Letters of Administration for the
administration of her late husband's estate, but was opposed in her attempts
to administer the estate by another administrator appointed by the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs pursuant to certain provisions in the Indian Act. Mr.
Justice Dickson held that by refusing the spouse of a deceased Indian the
right to apply for administration of his or her spouse's estate, a right which
all other Canadians have, the relevant provisions of the Indian Act con-
stitute a denial on the basis of race alone of equality before the law and equal
protection of the law, and are rendered invalid by the Canadian Bill of Rights.
He did not go so far as to assert, as some have, that the entire Indian Act is
invalid; he recognized that a degree of special treatment is necessary to
provide fairly for the problems of Canada's native people. He refused, how-
ever, to accept the argument that because they have special rights under the
Act, Indian people should be expected to accept corresponding disqualifica-
tions. His treatment of that argument is worth quoting:
In reaching that conclusion I have not been unaware of the argument frequently
advanced that Parliament in its wisdom in enacting the Indian Act embodied
40 (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 502 (Man. C.A.).
4 1 R. v. McKay (1971), 20 D.LR. (3d) 336 (Man. C.A.).
42 (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Man. C.A.).
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therein many provisions which are of advantage to Indians, when compared with
other Canadians, as well as some which place Indians at a disadvantage It can
hardly have been the intention of Parliament, it is said, that the Bill of Rights
would have the effect of making inoperative the provisions which place Indians
at a disadvantage, leaving untouched those provisions which are to their ad-
vantage. I cannot agree with that argument. The Bill of Rights, as I read it, is
intended to erase all marks of servitude based on race, national origin, colour,
religion or sex. It is not consonant with reason or justice that Indians forfeit
basic rights and freedoms which other men are assured through the Bill of Rights,
for the reason that the Indian Act gives Indians certain perquisites not shared
by other men. One cannot place in a balance, and weigh, legal equality and
material benefits, concluding in the end that each is of equal weight and they
therefore cancel each other out. The freedoms expressed in the Bill of Rights
cannot be bartered away.
Nor am I unaware of the contention that Indians have throughout been in a
state of dependency, and pupillage and must so continue for their own protec-
tion. This argument in substance equates Indians with children and mental
defectives. It is not an analogy which I can accept. If the Bill of Rights means
anything, it means that no racial group shall be deemed inferior to any other
racial group in the enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Clearly one of the central purposes is to eliminate any and all kinds of racial
discrimination in order that the colour of a person's skin shall not determine his
rights before the law.43
Coming from a man who is not given to rhetoric, these words leave little
doubt where Dickson stands on civil liberties, at least where equality of
opportunity is concerned. Civil libertarians have no reason to fear Mr. Justice
Hall's replacement by Mr. Justice Dickson.
Reference was made earlier to certain impressions gained from an ex-
amination of Dickson's reported trial judgments. When his work on the Court
of Appeal is also taken into account, most of those impressions are reinforced,
and some new ones appear. Thoroughness is an example; to an even greater
extent than in his early judgments, Dickson can now be counted on to
research his decisions exhaustively, both as to relevant cases and statutes
and as to any non-legal material that might be pertinent.44 On occasion the
research seems to extend further than is really necessary for the decision, and
one senses a thirst to learn new things that sometimes transcends pragmatism.
Dickson's efforts to improve his facility in French may stem from the
same source. He had acquired a working knowledge of French in his Euro-
pean travels, but when French instruction was made available to members
of the bench a few years ago, he eagerly took advantage of the opportunity
to improve his knowledge. And when, by chance, it turned out that his first
Supreme Court law clerk was French-Canadian, he resolved to strengthen
his bilingual capacity still further by carrying on all discussion with his clerk
relating to Quebec cases in the French language.
Few of Dickson's early judgments had much literary merit; he said what
had to be said plainly, and without flourish, and went on to the next matter.
This is still generally true of his work, but one encounters well-turned phrases
and quotable epigrams rather more frequently in his more recent judgments.
48Id. at 20-21.
44 It should not be supposed that his early work was defective in this regard, how-
ever. See: Hofer v. Hofer (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 723 (Man. Q.B.), for example.
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Perhaps in this respect - as in the case of his French language capability -
there is a conscious self-improvement effort in progress.
The final observation concerns the extent of Dickson's fidelity to legal
forms. It was alleged above that the reasoning of some of his early decisions
had the appearance of being result-oriented, and although the process is not
so obvious in his more recent judgments, the high correlation between his
conclusions and those that would probably be reached by a tribunal composed
of barbers or taxi drivers is far from co-incidental. He has displayed a will-
ingness to slip off the shackles of stare decisis when necessary, and his
interpretation of both legislative and contractual language has sometimes been
inventive. Yet Dickson is not Lord Denning. He usually works within the
latitudes permitted by orthodox legal techniques, and if they do not
permit an outcome that he would regard as equitable, he normally accepts
that the matter is out of his hands. When discussing his attitude about fidelity
to law with the writer, Dickson described it as a presumption in favour of
justice. He starts with a desire to reach a fair and equitable solution in each
case, and does not abandon that goal unless it appears that the law has placed
some impassable hurdle in the way of its attainment.
What contribution can Brian Dickson be expected to make to the
Supreme Court of Canada? He will certainly not attract the attention his
predecessor did. Nor will he be likely to sire many revolutionary breaks with
the past. But he can be counted on to employ his skill in the politics of group
decision-making, as well as his other prodigious talents, to nudge the court
insistently, if unobstrusively, in the direction of just results for individual
litigants and the gradual improvement of Canadian law.
19741

